ATTENTION – THIS IS AN AUTOMATIC TRANSLATION
In its resolution of 10 January 2025 (case no. III CZP 35/24), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether parents who have a maintenance obligation towards their incapacitated child are entitled to remuneration for providing care to such a child (Article 162 § 2 of the Family and Guardianship Code).
The mother of a person who was fully incapacitated applied for public funds to remunerate her for providing care. However, the court held that the mother’s care constituted the fulfilment of her maintenance obligation, and that her personal involvement—despite the sacrifices involved—fell within the scope of socially and legally accepted parental duties.
If the guardian of an incapacitated person is a parent who is subject to a maintenance obligation, they will generally not receive additional remuneration. In exceptional, particularly justified circumstances, there may be grounds for granting remuneration if the scope of care goes far beyond what can be expected of a parent under the principles of social coexistence. Nevertheless, such a decision always requires an individual assessment, and the Court’s evaluation must take into account the specific circumstances of the case and avoid a formulaic approach.
In the cited ruling, the Supreme Court stated that “the assumption and exercise of care by the mother over her incapacitated son constitute an expression of the fulfilment of the guardian’s personal moral duties towards the ward.” The Court further noted that the performance of these duties is reinforced by the statutory maintenance obligation, which encompasses not only financial support but also the personal efforts of the obligated party (Article 133 § 1 of the Family and Guardianship Code).